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Abstract: Many real-world planning and decision problems are far too uncertain, too vari-
able, and too complicated to support realistic mathematical models. Nonetheless, we explain
the usefulness, in these situations, of qualitative insights from mathematical decision theory.
We demonstrate the integration of info-gap robustness in decision problems in which surprise
and ignorance are predominant and where personal and collective psychological factors are
critical. We present practical guidelines for employing adaptable choice-strategies as a proxy
for robustness against uncertainty. These guidelines include being prepared for more surprises
than we intuitively expect, retaining sufficiently many options to avoid premature closure and
conflicts among preferences, and prioritizing outcomes that are steerable, whose consequences
are observable, and that do not entail sunk costs, resource depletion, or high transition costs.
We illustrate these concepts and guidelines with the example of the medical management of
the 2003 SARS outbreak in Vietnam.
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1 Introduction
There are well-understood formal frameworks for decision making under risk, i.e., when we
know all of the possible outcomes of our acts, and we know the probabilities of those outcomes
conditional on our acts, and we know the quality or utility of each outcome. Under these
conditions we can maximize a measure of quality (such as expected utility) and thereby optimize
our choice of acts. An often unstated assumption here is that we know all of these things
precisely, i.e., without error.
In the presence of error, maximization and optimization of outcomes may no longer be
reliable. Nevertheless, frameworks such as info-gap theory, fuzzy logic and imprecise probability
provide principled, mathematically-grounded methods for decision making when we have only
vague estimates of probabilities and utilities.
However, what if we don’t know probabilities or utilities or even all possible acts and out-
comes? What constitutes reasoned decision-making when mathematics cannot be applied?
What are “robust” or “adaptable” decisions? How to apply qualitative insights from mathe-
matical decision theory, to situations without mathematical models?
We make the following claims about reasoned decisions without math.
1. In an open world, rich in undiscovered contingencies, we are ignorant of important aspects
of the future. Under ignorance, prepare to be surprised (section 2). In section 3 we briefly
describe severe uncertainties facing decision makers in epidemiology and public health.
2. Under severe uncertainty, optimizing the quality of the outcome is infeasible and unwise.
Satisfying outcome requirements is better than attempting to optimize the outcome-
quality (section 4).
3. Adaptable choices allow innovation or improvisation as new information and understand-
ing emerges. Adaptable or reversible choices are more robust than “locked-in” choices
(provided the decision maker avoids indecision). More options are better than fewer,
unless we become indecisive. Adaptability is a proxy for robustness against surprise and
ignorance (section 5).
These ideas are evaluated in section 6 by discussing the 2003 SARS outbreak in Vietnam.
2 Ignorance and Surprise
We should consider surprises to be far more likely than our intuition tells us that they are. Ex-
perimental research demonstrates that human judges chronically under-estimate the likelihood
of novel events. Even experts err in their domains of expertise.
The Catch-All Underestimation Bias (CAUB),(1) stipulates that if event categories are
combined under a single super-set then the probability that people assign to the super-set
typically is less than the sum of the probabilities assigned to the component categories (see
also Tversky and Koehler(2)). For example, someone asked to estimate the probability that they
will be delayed tomorrow will usually assign a lower number than the sum of the numbers they
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would assign to the probabilities of being late to rise, delayed by traffic, distracted at lunch,
etc. The super-set skips the details and thus ignores unanticipated and surprising events.
In addition to the CAUB, human judges are susceptible to “partition dependence”. On
grounds of insufficient reason, a probability of 1/K is assigned to K mutually exclusive possible
events when nothing is known about the likelihood of those events. Fox and Rottenstreich(3)
demonstrated experimentally that subjective probability judgments are biased towards this
prior probability distribution even given contrary evidence. Probability judgments are partition
dependent in the sense that they are influenced by the value of K that people believe is
applicable. The value of K is influenced by the agent’s perceptions of possible events and
ignores surprising or unanticipated categories.
Various methods can make an agent’s intuitive probability of surprise larger and more
realistic. First, exploit people’s suggestibility regarding partitions, and explicitly include a
“novel outcome” category. Second, detailed descriptions of unknowns will tend to increase the
intuitive partitioning of novel events, thereby increasing the intuitive probability of surprise.
Third, and conversely, less detailed descriptions of previously observed outcomes will tend
to coarsen the partitioning of known events, thereby biasing people towards a lower total
probability of encountering familiar events.
3 Decisions Without Math: Epidemiology and Public Health
Mathematical models can be quite useful in determining public health policy for prevention or
control of epidemic disease. For instance, linear differential equations can predict the course
of tuberculosis (TB) in a population.(4) Such models can be used to determine the fraction of
new cases that must be detected, and of these, the fraction that must be successfully treated,
in order to achieve specified long-term reduction of the disease in the population.
The value of mathematical models of epidemiological processes is limited by uncertainties.
For instance, the population dynamics of TB is altered in conflicting and uncertain ways by the
presence of HIV/AIDS. On the one hand, HIV/AIDS enhances the spread of TB by making
individuals more vulnerable to infection. On the other hand, HIV/AIDS is a major cause of
death and can thereby reduce the spread of TB. These conflicting tendencies make it chal-
lenging (though not impossible) to use quantitative epidemiological models of TB to formulate
public health policy in the presence of HIV/AIDS. For instance, if prevention of HIV/AIDS is
enhanced, existing TB models do not always provide clear indication of whether intervention
against TB can be reduced or must be enhanced, and by how much. Nonetheless, the main
features of the disease are understood, and existing TB models can be usefully employed by
robustifying them against uncertainties resulting from HIV/AIDS.(5)
The situation with a new disease is quite different. Consider, for instance, the 2003 SARS
outbreak in Vietnam, as described by Plant.(6) The infectious organism was unidentified and
public health officials did not know the clinical course (“would everyone die?”), the mechanism
of spread, the timing of recovery and infectiousness, and other elements that are crucial for
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disease management. As Plant writes: “Despite these unknowns, we had to make decisions—
who to admit to hospital, how to manage their clinical course and what to advise their relatives
or the health staff looking after them.” Mathematical models, as well as much requisite scientific
knowledge, are unavailable when these decisions must be made.
4 Optimizing, Satisficing and Robustness: SARS Example
We will consider an example motivated by the discussion of SARS in section 3. A new and
evidently highly contagious disease has caused a sharp rise of illness and a number of deaths
in an economically and politically important city. The course of the disease, mechanisms of
transmission, and severity are all very poorly known. A team of medical experts is tasked with
containing the disease while not unduly disrupting daily life in the city and beyond. They must
choose among several distinct actions. In simplified form, the team may need to choose between
(1) complete travel prohibition to and from the city, (2) ten-day quarantine of all individuals
before exiting the city, (3) ten-day quarantine of individuals exposed to symptomatic individuals
before exiting the city, and (4) free entrance and exit. We will ignore the many other decisions
that must be made.
Three sources of uncertainties can be identified. First, the degree of similarity to known
diseases is highly uncertain. In the present case, the infecting organism has not been identified
and its medical characteristics are hardly known. Second, the degree of disruption resulting
from each of the 4 available actions is uncertain and depends on whose travel is restricted,
and for how long, and on the extent to which electronic communications can replace travel
for maintaining economic and political activity. Third, the relative importance of, and inter-
dependence between, control of the disease and disruption of daily life, are both difficult to
assess.
Using judgment based on experience, the team is able to make rough predictions of epi-
demiological, economic and political impacts of each of the 4 interventions. However, it is clear
to the team that these predictions could be substantially wrong: either better or worse than
subsequent real outcomes.
This realization—that predictions are highly unreliable—leads the team to its first method-
ological conclusion: Prioritizing the interventions based on their predicted outcomes is highly
unreliable. As an example, suppose that complete travel prohibition is predicted to have a bet-
ter overall outcome than, say, quarantine of exposed individuals. Because the predictions are
highly uncertain it might well be that quarantine is more propitious than expected, and that
complete closure more pernicious than predicted. The quality of the actual future outcomes
may in fact be ranked in the reverse order from the predictions. Due to the severe uncer-
tainties that accompany the available understanding, we can have little confidence that the
putative ranking is accurate. Consequently, complete closure cannot be reliably preferred over
quarantine.
How should the team rank the action-alternatives, if not with predictions based on the best
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available knowledge? The answer to this question depends on the second methodological
conclusion: the quality of outcome that can be guaranteed gets worse as the level of uncertainty
rises. We explain this as follows.
Let Ai denote one of the available actions that the medical team could choose. Our best
understanding predicts an outcome of implementing this action, which we will refer to as the
putative prediction for action Ai. Suppose we err at most just a little: our information and
understanding are at most just a little bit uncertain. What is the worst outcome that could
happen with Ai? If the worst were to happen (assuming we err just a little) the outcome would
be a little bit worse than the putative prediction.
Now suppose we err a bit more (we face slightly larger epistemic uncertainty). The worst
outcome with Ai is poorer than before. As we consider greater level of error, the worst that
could result from action Ai gets worse. The worst than could happen (or equivalently, the best
that can be guaranteed) gets worse as the horizon of uncertainty increases. This is the trade
off between guaranteed outcome and uncertainty.
We must now introduce the idea of robustness to uncertainty, and this hinges on the idea of
acceptable outcomes. Our discussion of robustness is framed in the context of info-gap decision
theory.(8)
The medical team is charged with containing the disease and with not disrupting daily
life. In a world with perfect information and understanding the disease would be eradicated
with minimal adverse impact. The team is too realistic to demand any such wonderful out-
come. However, they (or other authorities) are able to make judgments of the lowest degree
of disease containment and the greatest social disruption that are acceptable. There may be
different combinations of containment and disruption that are acceptable, and these judgments
themselves may be uncertain.
The robustness to uncertainty of an intervention, Ai, is the greatest level of uncertainty
at which an acceptable outcome is guaranteed. If an action is putatively unacceptable, then it
has no robustness to uncertainty because an acceptable outcome cannot be guaranteed at any
level of uncertainty.
Let us suppose that available action Ai is putatively acceptable. As we have explained, the
worst that could occur as a result of action Ai gets progressively worse as the level of uncer-
tainty increases. The worst possible outcome with Ai crosses the threshold from acceptable to
unacceptable at some level of uncertainty. This level is the robustness to uncertainty of action
Ai.
Combining the trade off between guaranteed outcome and level of uncertainty, with the ideas
of robustness and acceptable outcome, leads us to the third methodological conclusion:
available actions should be prioritized according to their robustness against uncertainty for
achieving acceptable outcomes. The medical team should prefer action Ai over Aj if Ai is
more robust than Aj for achieving an acceptable outcome. The most robust action will lead
to an acceptable outcome over the widest range of deviation of future reality from current
understanding. This methodological conclusion asserts that the medical team should choose
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the action that will satisfy the outcome requirements as robustly as possible. This is called
robust satisficing. What is optimized is robustness against surprise, rather than optimizing
the substantive outcome. Robustness is an attribute of an action but it is not an outcome of
substantive importance like disease eradication or economic and political functionality.
The most robust action may, or may not, be the putatively optimal action. The action
that is predicted to be best may, or may not, be the most robust for achieving an acceptable
outcome. Prioritizing the actions based on their robustness for satisfying the outcome require-
ments, may not agree with prioritizing based on predicted outcomes. Optimizing substantive
outcomes based on the best available knowledge, and robustly satisfying outcome requirements,
are conceptually different decision strategies that may lead to different decisions, as we now
illustrate.
There are two situations in which robust satisficing and outcome optimizing are opera-
tionally the same. If the putatively best action is also the least uncertain, then its trade off
between quality and uncertainty is least severe. It will then be more robust than any other
available action at any level of required outcome. In this case, the robust satisficing and
outcome optimizing strategies will agree on the decision, though for different reasons.
Robust satisficing and outcome optimizing also lead to the same decision if the required
outcome is extremely demanding. In this case, only the putatively optimal action has any
robustness at all for satisfying the outcome requirement. Once again the robust satisficer and
the putative optimizer agree on the decision, though for different reasons.
Outcome optimizing and robust satisficing lead to different decisions if the putative op-
timum is more uncertain than an alternative and if the outcome requirement is not too de-
manding. In this case, due to the trade off between guaranteed outcome and uncertainty, the
putative optimum could be the less robust alternative. This is common when the putative
optimum exploits an innovative technology which, because it’s new, is less well understood
than more familiar alternatives.(9)
The robust satisficing decision strategy is advantageous when facing severe uncertainty.
In the next section we ask: how can one make the judgments needed for implementing this
strategy, without mathematical analysis?
5 Adaptability and Robustness: The Human Dimension
We defined robustness-to-uncertainty, of an intervention, as the greatest level of uncertainty at
which an acceptable outcome is guaranteed. Under extreme uncertainty it may be impossible
to quantify robustness or levels of uncertainty, and it may also be impossible to ascertain when
an acceptable outcome is guaranteed. Nevertheless, a decision maker’s ability to adapt—to
revise, reverse or correct earlier actions—is a plausible proxy for robustness against surprise
and ignorance. Adaptability enables the decision maker to persist in the pursuit of specified
goals despite ignorance and in response to surprise and the discovery of error.
Our argument in this section is that the feasibility of deliberative—rather than computa-
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tional—implementation of robust satisficing hinges on the successful facilitation of adaptability.
Adaptability must be achieved in response to both personal and inter-personal uncertainties.
5.1 Achieving Inter-Personal Adaptability
Important decisions often are made in social contexts. Likewise, decision makers have psycho-
logical natures that must be accounted for in enhancing adaptability.
Decision-related consequences arising from other people typically pertain to issues of ac-
countability, exploitation, and, of course, negative or positive responses to decisions. Tetlock(10)
discusses three adaptive imperatives. First, decision makers must cope with accountability de-
mands from others in their networks or groups. These settings stipulate who must answer to
whom, for what, and by what rules. Second, the decision maker must be able to exert social
influence, to impose accountability demands on others who might otherwise exploit the decision
maker (and others) without contributing their fair share or respecting other important social
norms. Third, the decision maker must retain a moral compass, i.e., to be able to believe that
the prevailing accountability norms and social influence measures are not immoral but instead
legitimated by an authority that transcends accidents or whims of dominant persons or groups.
Accountability, social influence, and legitimation usually are achieved and enforced by
means of policies, laws, contracts, and related practices that contribute to what may be called
“assurance”. Unfortunately for decision makers who wish to keep options open in the pursuit of
robustness, assurance eliminates options in the name of predictability and control. Elimination
of options is the essence of bureaucratic regulation, and is one way of reducing uncertainty.
However, by impeding adaptability, bureaucratic regulation loses robustness against either sur-
prises from the physical world or resistance from those people being regulated.
Decision makers can avoid restrictive regulations and accountability demands by subverting
them via secrecy, avoiding accountability by evading the imposition of measurable outcomes
or specified goals (e.g. Moore(11) on politicians’ decisional practices), and disguising illicit
practices as legitimate. This coping style also is seen at the group or organizational level,
as described in Goffman’swork on organizational “back-stage” operations(12) and March and
Olsen’s garbage-can model of group decision making.(13) Goffman documented the necessity
of informal operations and arrangements in order for members to perform their organizational
roles. In the garbage can model, organizational decision making not only often is subterranean
but also post-hoc, in the sense that the problem for which a choice is supposed to be a “so-
lution” will be defined only after the choice has been made. Moral qualms about secrecy and
disinformation aside, neither of these practices are robust against the potential reactions of
other stakeholders.
An alternative way of keeping options open while dealing with social requirements is to
build relationships and networks based on trust instead of assurance. Trust-based relation-
ships obviate accountability to some extent because trust precludes intense surveillance of an
entrusted party by the trusting party. Likewise, mutual trust entrains mutual social influ-
ence via interdependence, thereby eliminating the need for social control practices that insure
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against exploitation. Some risk theorists, e.g. Kasperson,(14) claim that when uncertainties
loom large, trust is important for decision making and getting things done.
5.2 Achieving Intra-Personal Adaptability
We now consider the psychology of the decision maker. Decision-related surprises arising
from the decision maker often involve changes in the decision maker’s beliefs, preferences,
or criteria for decision making. Decision makers can enhance their own robustness against
these uncertainties by keeping options open. Two issues are central: avoiding incompatible
preferences and decisional criteria, and avoiding indecision. The first is an example of the
benefits of multiple alternatives and the second is an example of the risks therein.
Increasing the number of alternatives can resolve incompatible preferences and decisional
criteria by providing intermediate options.(15,16)
However, the presence of multiple alternatives may increase the likelihood of indecisive-
ness. Indecision is a potential threat to adaptability and robustness. Nonetheless, the risk of
indecision is enhanced only by particular kinds of choice sets and decisional conditions.
There are two kinds of indecision: Decision aversion and decision obsession.(17) Decision
aversion (DA) is a disposition to avoid undertaking decisions altogether, and may be driven by
decisional costs or difficulty, anticipated emotions such as regrets, and anticipatory emotions
such as dread or depression. Decision obsession (DO) is a tendency to ruminate excessively
about a decision, thereby impeding it. DO includes “paralysis by analysis” and may be driven
by accountability requirements, need for self-justification, or perceived magnitude or impor-
tance of consequences. Thus, DO usually results in decisions being delayed or revisited many
times, whereas DA results in failures to initiate the decision making process at all. There is
extensive literature on the factors that can increase DA or DO.(18,19,20)
6 Conclusion: Deliberative Decision Making and the SARS
Outbreak
We will conclude by engaging in a dialog between the main points of the paper and a case-
study. Plant’s description(6) of her team’s experiences during the SARS outbreak in Vietnam
is sufficiently detailed that we can examine it for instances of our recommendations or, on the
other hand, decisional tactics or strategies that we did not cover.
In section 2 we link ignorance with surprise and recommend ways for decision makers to
prepare themselves for surprises. The greatest challenge of severe uncertainty is that its identity
is unknown. In the SARS example this is illustrated by the medical team not knowing all of the
decisions that they will have to make. For instance “If a woman has SARS, should her husband
be allowed to serve food in his restaurant?”(6,p.48) The SARS case demonstrates the importance
of characterizing the uncertain quantities while combating the tendency to under-estimate the
likelihood of surprises.
In section 4 we highlighted three methodological points regarding decision making. Our first
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conclusion was that predicted outcomes are highly unreliable, with the implication that these
predictions, per se, should not be used to select an action. Second, we explained the trade
off between the level of uncertainty and the quality of an outcome that can be guaranteed.
Finally, combining the first two points, we concluded that alternatives should be prioritized
according to their robustness against uncertainty in achieving acceptable outcomes. In short,
we advocated robust satisficing rather than optimizing the outcome. Plant refers to an idea
somewhat related to the idea of satisficing when she describes her responses to questions from
the public as being “as good as I could manage in a changing state of understanding about the
outbreak”.(6,p.52)
Plant does not refer to robustness per se, but mentions on several occasions that her team
based many early decisions on assuming that SARS was a virus and treated it as similar to other
viruses.(6,p.49) The use of analogs between new unknown phenomena and previous experience
is commonplace, especially for decision making in complex dynamic environments,(21) but its
robustness to uncertainty is debatable. The high uncertainty of analogical reasoning motivates
the strategy of learning and adapting, as the SARS team did very explicitly. The SARS
team had to gather more information (including surprises) to resolve the issue of when to
“think outside the box” or to continue reasoning analogically from past experience. Plant also
indicates an adaptive approach to resolving uncertainties, saying that questions about why the
outbreak occurred and possible health system failures had to await the identification of the
virus, inventing a test for it and determining its modes of transmission.
Recommendations for adaptable decision alternatives are:
1. Leave desirable options open rather than prematurely closing them off.
2. Retain sufficiently many alternatives to avoid conflicts between outcome preferences and
for choosing between alternatives.
3. Prioritize reversible or steerable options over irrevocable ones.
4. Prioritize options that do not require sunk costs, resource depletion, or high transition
costs.
5. Where possible, ensure that decision outcomes are observable. Monitor and learn from
outcomes.
Plant’s account directly refers to item 5. and implicitly to 1. and 3. Although the team
began by acting on assumptions about SARS, they quickly moved to testing those assumptions:
“Even before we had blood tests, we were planning studies to determine how many people were
infected with the virus but had no symptoms, and how many people the average sick person
infected, to name just two areas of interest”.(6,p.49) Thus, a major proportion of the team’s
resources and time were devoted to obtaining new information. Implicit is the recognition that
treatment decisions and policies had to be malleable as new information came in, and that
other options might need to be kept open. The team also was aware that new information
might not immediately resolve uncertainties and could even generate new ones: “Even as
information accumulates, we may still not know how to interpret that information. Does the
[newly obtained] fact that SARS virus can no longer be detected in respiratory secretions mean
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that the person is no longer infectious? Does the [new] fact that SARS virus can be detected
in faeces mean that the person is infectious?”(6,p.49)
Other examples of how additional information could add to uncertainty are found in post-
epidemic accounts such as Johnston and Conly.(7) They noted that while the majority of data
indicated contagion by droplet and contact, at least two clusters of cases suggested the possi-
bility of airborne spread. They also observed that hospital and health-care worker experiences
and risks outside of Vietnam often diverged substantially from the Vietnam experience, thereby
casting doubt on some of the initial conclusions about how to manage risks to health-care work-
ers.
Section 5 also emphasizes the importance of uncertainties stemming from psychological
and social sources. Plant discusses this issue at length, noting that “Perhaps the most chal-
lenging part of uncertainty is in dealing with the human side of uncertainty and its resultant
anxiety.”(6,p.49) Anxiety arising from unknowns is a key concern for her, because in her view
it is chiefly responsible for the variety of dysfunctional or irrelevant ways of coping with the
outbreak that she describes.(6,pp.49−51) A few of the coping styles in her list correspond to our
descriptions of decision aversion and decision obsession, both of which are types of indecision.
We recognize that anxiety is likely to be a major concern for decision makers under extreme
uncertainty and pressure. However, our discussion of indecision focused on factors contributing
to the difficulty of selecting among alternatives, and a full discussion of ways of dealing with
anxiety is beyond our scope. Nevertheless, our recommendations of ways to decrease selection
difficulty would decrease anxiety as a byproduct.
The material in section 5 on inter-personal adaptability emphasized the benefits of building
trust-based relationships where possible, preventing reactance by avoiding unnecessary regula-
tions or restrictions, and seeking input from stakeholders with diverse viewpoints. In addition
to managing the SARS team, Plant’s role as team leader included liaising with the Ministry of
Health, consulate staff at several embassies, international agencies, and the Vietnamese press.
She refers to the importance of trust in establishing effective links with key stakeholders, i.e.,
leaders, spokespeople and media. A key point here is the rapidity with which these links needed
to be made in order to head off the potential impact of rumors or misinformation. An absence
of trust would have made that impossible.
Plant makes a pertinent observation about the desirability of diverse inputs:
Ten years ago the call would have been for epidemiologists, clinicians and perhaps
laboratory people. Now a typical team will consist of two epidemiologists, one social
mobiliser (to deal with issues around the response such as working with communi-
cation via local leaders, radio stations etc.) and two medical anthropologists. This
change reflects our current knowledge in dealing with an outbreak, namely that it is
important to recognise the framework within which the affected population operates
. . . A person such as a medical anthropologist would, of course, provide a different
view of the outbreak and the issues that were uncertain (and their management)
from mine”.(6,p.46)
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This last sentence is interesting for its observation that different stakeholders may not only
know different things, but also may have different views about the unknowns. Under extreme
uncertainty, diverse inputs about the nature of the unknowns may be one of the most important
correctives to a decision maker’s initial appraisal of a problem and its prospects.
Decisions under uncertainty arise in every domain of human activity, and mathematical
analysis is often applicable. There are, however, important situations in which information and
understanding are insufficient to realistically and responsibly support mathematical analysis.
Nonetheless, qualitative insights from quantitative decision theory are still relevant. Difficult
judgments remain to be made, and a “language barrier” between the mathematical analysts
and the decision makers in qualitative domains must be crossed. Resolving these difficulties
is as important as the decisions themselves. Furthermore, the nature of the uncertainties and
methods for dealing with them are changed by the absence of mathematics. Uncertainty about
the physical world becomes in large measure a human uncertainty that must be managed
through inter- and intra-personal adaptability.
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